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INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO AN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS:

THE FAILURE OF STATE AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL

*

By JAN LArros**
INTRODUCTION
ACED with increasing air pollution resulting from rising
population and industrial growth, the Colorado legislature
responded by enacting a series of state air pollution control laws.'
An examination of these laws, the various agencies which they
created,2 and the effectiveness of the legislative and administrative response to the state's air pollution problem, forms the
basis of this article.
The article does not purport to discuss the economic, political,
or sociological ramifications of formalized air pollution control
efforts; nor does it propose any tentative recommendations for
a revision of the current state pollution control program. Rather,
its scope is limited to disclosing how and why the state's legal
responses to the problem of air pollution have not been successful. More precisely, it examines how these responses were fashioned by a sequence of events through which the problem was
first identified, then recognized by official governmental bodies,
and finally confronted by agencies and institutions charged with
solving the problem but ill-equipped and unwilling to affect it.
From these observations one can begin to evaluate whether the
law's function in the context of control over the environment
has been correctly perceived.
Although the primary focus of the discussion is on the re*

This article is drawn from a study of Colorado's air pollution agencies
which began in the summer of 1970 and was updated to 1972. The initial
1970 study was funded by the Ford Foundation as part of the Environmental Law Intern Program at the University of Colorado School of

Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the impetus and
encouragement provided by Professor Don Carmichael who supervised
the study and would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Luize Laitos,
the author's persevering wife, who helped edit the article.
** B.A., Yale College, 1968; J.D., University of Colorado Law School, 1971.
Mr. Laitos was Comments Editor of the Colorado Law Review and is a
member of the Colorado Bar. He is currently law clerk for the Honorable Edward E. Pringle, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
1 The most recent and comprehensive of such laws is the 1970 Colorado
Air Pollution Control Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 66-31-1 to -26

(Supp. 1971).
2The following agencies were created by statute in Colorado: the
Variance Board, the Air Pollution Control Division, and the Air
Pollution Control Commission. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -26
(Supp. 1971).
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sponse of Colorado institutions to air pollution, the analysis applies to the many other pollution problems that affect the
the environment. It is therefore hoped that an examination of
the Colorado experience will benefit other states in their attempts
to deal with the current environmental crisis.
I. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A.

The Nature of the Problem
Ironically, the air pollution crisis is essentially a product of
economic success. The principle sources of air pollution employ
millions of Americans, significantly contribute to the Gross National Product, and satisfy needs which have become essential to
daily existence.
If air pollution is an environmental crisis born of success,
it is by implication a problem which is here to stay. Even with
the great public outcry against automobile pollution, it has been
predicted that it will be 1992 before the automobile ceases to be
a major polluter.3 With respect to industrial pollution, the
public's myopic perception of private industry protects this
major offender from effective criticism. A similar problem
exists with respect to the third great source of air pollutionthe publicly regulated utility companies, which are by far the
most significant stationary air polluters. As with the automobile and industry, their continued existence is indispensible to
modern life.
The specifics of the pollution problem may also be seen
from a more conceptual level. Fundamentally, air pollution is a
problem because pollution source P harms citizen C. If C complains, P must respond to the complaint, or some intermediate
body, such as an agency, A, will become involved. Usually P will
not respond because C is incapable of generating sufficient pressure; therefore, C's only effective recourse is to turn to A. A
must stand between P and C and work towards a compromise.
A must require each party to sacrifice something-in the case of
P it is usually time and money; in the case of C it is tax money
and the increased cost of goods produced by non-polluters. If
neither P nor C are willing to sustain the sacrifice required by
this "outsider," A's efforts fail.
There is another variation on this conceptual theme. Since
P is hurting C through P's air pollution, it appears that the only
way to help C is to hurt P. However, this ignores the fact that
C is also unwittingly hurting himself. For example, consider C
as an automobile owner or a worker in the polluter factory.
3

Dr. James P. Lodge, Chairman, Air Pollution Control Commission,

Denver Post, Nov. 28, 1971, at 58, col. 1.
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Since C is conditioned to ignore the fact that he is harming himself, it is almost impossible to convince him to make the necessary sacrifices (e.g., install costly air pollution control devices
in his car or take the bus to work every day). This reciprocal
nature of the air pollution problem-the P-C dichotomy-sometimes complicated by an intervening governmental agency, significantly contributes to the difficulties of grappling with the
problem.
It is evident that an ultimate choice cannot be made between
pollution on the one hand and the elimination of its sources on
the other. A compromise must be effected. Unfortunately, due
to the political and practical problems involved, the difficulty
of arriving at a satisfactory solution is of considerable magnitude.
The Gravity of the Problem
Despite the inherent difficulty in solving the air pollution
problem, its gravity makes some degree of abatement essential.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency's Rocky
Mountain Regional Administrator, the most important environ4
mental problem facing Colorado is air pollution.
Colorado's urban centers, located along the eastern slope of
the Rocky Mountain uplift, are faced with a "natural" air pollution problem. These areas lie in a basin created by the mountains
which prevents effective wind dispersal along a north-south axis
while supporting inversions which trap the pollutants over the
cities. ' As a result of this situation, the annual average concentration of particulates throughout the Denver City-County area
is above the level suspected of causing increased mortality for
people over 50 years of age. This high particulate concentration
has been responsible for an occasional reduction of visibility to
less than 8 miles, as well as a cost to Denver residents of over
$100 per capita annually. 6
B.

Concentrations of non-particulate air pollutants are equally
offensive. Sulfur oxides cause metal corrosion; photochemical
oxidants cause nose and throat irritation as well as vegetation
damages; and carbon monoxide levels in Denver are high
enough to decrease the oxygen carrying capacity of the blood
7
and thus interfere with time-interval discrimination.
4 Address by John Green, Rocky Mountain States Section of the Air

Polluticn Control Association Dinner Meeting, Dec. 8, 1971.
. Denver is classed by the Environmental Protection Agency as being,
along with Salt Lake City, one of the nation's two worst urban air
pollution areas. Denver Post Mar. 26, 1972, at 57, col. 1.
6 COLORADO DEP'T OF HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PUBLIC ON AIR POLLUTION7

1971 at 11.
Id. at 10-12.
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II. RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION
The mere existence of a problem does not necessarily insure
recognition and response. Accordingly, it was many years after
air pollution had become acute in Colorado before the gravity of
the state's problem was specifically identified. However, by the
mid-1960's, pollution had become a visible problem not only in
Denver but in several other burgeoning urban centers. This, together with the increasing appearance of anti-pollution literature,
precipitated gradual public awareness of the severity of the problem and the need for remedial action. Since traditional legal
doctrines were inadequate,8 the burden fell on the legislature to
formulate a remedy.
In addressing the problem, the legislature was confronted
with two basic tasks: first, it had to make pollution of the air
illegal; second, it had to provide a method of enforcement. The
only important choice before the legislature with respect to illegality was whether to set the standards and emission levels by
law or to delegate the responsibility to an administrative agency.
As to the enforcement of the law, however, the choice was less
clear-cut. 9
8 A traditional legal response takes the shape of remedies through the

courts and remedies through the legislature. The first possibility is
adequate only if the legislature has already sanctioned a method by
which an aggrieved citizen or official can prove that a particular type
of air pollution caused by a particular source is illegal. Absent such
legislative causes of action, the aggrieved plaintiff is forced to rely
on traditional common law remedies, usually in tort and specifically
in nuisance. However, the common law concept of nuisance has not
been universally broadened to allow an individual to successfully petition a eourt to enjoin a particular source's air pollution. Hobbs v. Smith,
493 P.2d 1352 (Colo. 1972); Robinson Brick v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169
P.2d 171 (1946).
9 The legislature had to decide whether to provide for citizen suits against
polluters or to create governmental machinery to carry out the law's
sanctions. This choice was between individual and collective action. The
advantage of the former is that in each ca-se there would be a comprehensive adjudication in court with a final black and white decree at the
termination of the legal proceeding. The disadvantage of he latter is
that administrative bodies would have to be created which could identify
the polluter, notify the source, determine whether a violation had
occurred, hold a hearing, and adjudicate the issue of remedies, as well
as be responsible for failures to control air pollution. Such newly created
administrative bodies would have to be staffed, equipped, and paid on
a relatively full-time basis.
On the other hand, governmental action has one significant advantage over individual action against air pollution. Reliance upon
governmental agencies is an ingrained tradition in American politics
and history. If a problem arises that needs to be corrected, the typical
American response has been to create an agency, give it the duty and
responsibility of curing the problem, and blame it should something
go awry. Faced with the choice of delegating responsibility to the
public and courts, or creating a government-sponsored apparatus which
was clearly identifiable and subject to examination, the Colorado legislature chose the latter.
But once the agency was decided upon as the means for curbing
air pollution, the issue became more complex. Should the legislature
create a monopolistic or integrated agency approach to the problem?
Should any primary agency be able to delegate some responsibility to
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Essentially there were four alternative enforcement techniques available to the legislature. First, it could have regulated
pollution either by performance standards or specification standards. 10 Performance standards specify the limits for particular
pollutants and forbid the potential polluter to exceed them, while
specification standards require only that pollution control devices meet ce rtain design and engineering requirements."
Secondly, the legislature could have subsidized air pollution
control programs by either providing tax incentives 12 or awarding payments to the polluter who initiates and establishes a
reliable pollution control program. Generally, subsidies are disfavored by legislatures as too difficult to administer and highly
unpopular with the public. The citizen taxpayer does not want
his tax monies to be disbursed as awards to polluting industries;
nor does he want businesses to be given additional tax breaks.
A third alternative open to the legislature was to institute
a pricing program whereby the polluter would be charged for
each unit of emission which violated a control standard. This
scheme is based on the assumption that the polluter does not
wish to be fined for his pollution, and therefore the economic
charges levied against him will motivate a more efficient disposal
of his waste. 3 The perceived political advantages of a pricing system lie in its decentralized approach to governmental regulation.
Moreover, it allows the polluter to change or alter production
methods in the way most advantageous and efficient to him while
maintaining responsiveness to traditional market forces. The
difficulty with this method, however, is that firms often decide
that the least expensive response to the imposition of fines is to
"pollute and pay" while passing the cost on to their customers.14
This difficulty is compounded by the infrequency with which
study groups for policy decisions and some responsibility to adjudicatory
bodies for fact-finding decisions? And, once the framework and organization of the agency's machinery is decided upon, its roles and functions
must yet be refined: should it be primarily regulator, decisionmaker,
policymaker, gatherer or disseminator of information? Unfortunately,
most of these important questions were unanswered as they were never
asked.
10 See Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control-State and Local
Legislative Purpose and Techniques, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 331

(1968).

11 Note, Local Regulation of Air Pollution, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 232.
12

This approach usually takes the form of accelerated depreciation and
investment credits.

13 J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRMES 81-82 (1968).
14

A 1972 tax on sulphur dumped into the air was criticized as costing
the polluter less than it would cost to install devises to remove sulphur
from smokestack emissions. Denver Post, Feb. 9, 1972, at 6, col. 1.
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fines are actually levied on polluters, and the fact that when
levied, these fines are often ludicrously low. 15
The fourth alternative technique was to require scrupulous
supervision by the agency charged with administering the state's
air pollution control program. Under this approach the agency
can obtain a court-ordered legal sanction against the polluting
source. Usually this sanction is in the form of an injunction or
a cease and desist order. Such sanctions are the most severe of
all remedies and therefore necessitate the most cumbersome
governmental apparatus. Before the equitable sanction is actually enforced, several steps must be taken to insure that due
process is not violated or that an unlawful "taking" has not
occurred.' 6 These intermediary steps lead to considerable delay
in enforcing the injunction, thereby allowing the violator's pollution problem to continue during the interim.
These were the alternatives before the Colorado state legislature in 1966 when it first faced the task of drafting legislation.
As has been noted, each alternative had political as well as technical and practical overtones. As a consequence, any solution
was expected to reflect a variety of considerations, thereby producing a result not entirely consistent with the original goal.
The object of the following analysis is to isolate the elements
of the decisionmaking process and examine their influence on
the success of the resulting statutory design.

III. THe CoLoRADO RESPONSE
In 1966 Colorado passed the first of a series of bills de7
signed to curb the state's growing air pollution. The 1966 Act'
contained three key features. First, various "basins" within
the state were delineated and required to decrease their air
contamination to a certain level fixed by the legislature.
Second, the Act created an Air Pollution Control Division responsible for enforcement. The Division was empowered to
single out individual or industrial sources which polluted in
excess of the permissable levels and issue cease and desist
orders in the event that the polluter failed to rectify his viola-

15 The Ford Motor Company, for example, was recently fined only $10,000

by the Environmental Protection Agency for delivering cars without
federal certification. Denver Post, Dec. 2, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
16 Walker, Enforcement of Performance Requirements with Injunctive
Procedure, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 81 (1968).
7

I CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-29-2 to -29

(Supp. 1967).
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tion within a reasonable time.' Third, an Air Pollution Variance
Board was created. Upon the issuance of a cease and desist
order by the Division, the polluter could petition the Board for
a "variance" from the law. This variance would suspend the
enforcement of the cease and desist order for a period specified
by the Board and thereby stay the time within which the
polluter was forced to shut down its polluting operations. 19
Ideally the variance would provide a "grace" period within
which the polluting company could work to install pollution
control equipment. Too often, however, a variance became
synonymous with a license to pollute.
In 1967 and 1968 minor amendments to the 1966 Act were
adopted, but the basic structure of the statute remained unchanged. However, it was becoming increasingly clear that the
original statute was ineffective. The primary deficiency was
the retention of too much responsibility and decisionmaking
authority by the legislature, particularly with respect to the
promulgation of ambient air standards. In response, the legislature decided to completely overhaul the 1966 Act. The result
was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1970.20
The 1970 Act provides for an Air Pollution Control Commission 21 to develop and maintain the state's program for prevention, control, and abatement of air pollution throughout the
state. In effect, the Commission replaces the legislature as the
body primarily responsible for developing an effective air pollution control program. Since its creation, the Commission has
been able to accomplish what the legislature could not do
effectively. It has classified and defined different degrees and
types of air pollution, has set emission control regulations, and
has promulgated ambient air standards.
Administration and enforcement of the air pollution control
programs adopted by the Commission remain in the hands of
the Division. The responsibility of the Division is to locate,
identify, and, if necessary, bring action against those parties
who violate the Commission's standards. 22 These tasks can be
performed either independently upon the Division's initiative,
or upon receipt of a formal complaint. 23 The Division is also
18 Id. § 66-29-8.
19 Id. § 66-29-7.
2
oCoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -26
21 Id. § 66-31-4.
22 Id. § 66-31-10.
23

Id.

(Supp. 1971).
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responsible for providing the Variance Board with technical
advice, services, and personnel, thereby acting as an arm of the
24
Board.
The provisions of the 1970 Act respecting the Variance
Board substantially redefine and rework the Board's functional
relationship to the other legal institutions created by the statute
2
Section 14
and also clarify some of its internal workings.
requirequorum
articulates
establishes the Board's composition,
ments, and provides for alternates to attend meetings in the
absence of regular Board members. Section 15 sets out the
grounds upon which the Board will be able to grant a variance.
Moreover, it grants the Board the right to place conditions upon
granted variances which, if not carried out, will void the
variance and reinstate the cease and desist order. This section
also gives the Board the power to "hold public hearings, conduct investigations, compel attendance of witnesses, receive
such pertinent and relevant proof and such other things as it
may deem to be necessary. '26 Finally, Section 16 sets forth the
broad rules of procedure within which the Board must operate.
The availability of judicial review is clarified by Section
17. Any "final order or determination" by the Variance Board,
the Division, or the Commission may now be appealed to a
Colorado district court. 27 Although the Commission remains
the first avenue of review for a Board decision granting or
denying a requested variance, 28 the Commission's predelictions
are so much in favor of affirming Board decisions that the
courts provide the first effective forum for review. Section 17's
mandate to "stay" all Board or Commission determinations
pending a court decision 29 encourages judicial review as a
popular recourse.
Other sections of the 1970 Act provide for the issuance of
30
injunctions to enforce violations of any cease and desist order,
for the levy of fines and civil penalties against polluters who
violate final cease and desist orders not subject to stays pending
Board or judicial review, 31 and for the prohibition of incinerator
24 Id.

Id. §§ 66-31-14 to -17.
Id. § 66-31-15 (6).
27Id. § 66-31-17 (1).
28 Id. § 66-31-16 (9).
29 Id.§ 66-31-17 (1).
30 Id. § 66-31-18.
31 Id. § 66-31-19.
25

26
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and open burning. 2 Section 25 attempts to define the relationship between the cities, towns, and counties and the Act. The
purpose of this section is to clearly express the legislature's
intent that the state statute shall invalidate all inconsistent
local air pollution laws or policies, including local variance
33
board decisions.
Perhaps the most important section in the Act is its "Legislative Declaration," expressing the broad policies of the state.
According to this pronouncement of legislative intent, the state
is to achieve "the maximum practical degree of air purity in
every portion of the state . ..by requiring the use of all available practical methods to reduce, prevent, and control air pollution. '3 4 This standard, along with the degree of air pollution
still existent in this state, must be remembered when examining
the numerous difficulties confronted by those operating under
the Air Pollution Control Act. It is also important to recall the
role envisioned for the most active, and hence the most interesting, administrative body created by the Act-the Variance
Board. The Board's purpose is to grant variances to those polluters who cannot meet the Commission's standards at the present,
but who, given enough time under a variance, can implement a
schedule to bring the polluting source into compliance with the
emission control regulations of the Commission. If convinced
by facts and statistics that this grace period is both necessary
and sufficient, the Board can grant a variance, stay the desist
order, and require the polluter to devote his full energies to
abating his pollution before the expiration of the term of the
variance. At the end of the variance, the pollution should be
within acceptable limits, and there should be no need for another variance or, more importantly, a cease and desist order.
Whether the Board has fulfilled or even approached this functional ideal will be examined in depth later in this article.
Before examining the difficulties and failings of the statute
itself, it may be worthwhile to note the significance of the
mere passage of the 1970 Act. The enactment of the 1970 statute,
repealing the existing legislation, indicated that most members
of the Colorado House and Senate in 1970 were convinced that
pollution was a problem, that this problem was not being corrected, that something had to be done immediately, and that
the state was prepared to assume responsibility for regulating
Id. § 66-31-20.
33Id.§§66-31-25 (1) to (3).
34 Id. § 66-31-2.
32
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pollution-causing activities. The guidelines established by the
Act served to make clear to affected parties what would occur
if the fact of pollution was established and approximately how
long it would be before action to alleviate the problem would
be undertaken. Therefore, both governmental response and
polluter reaction to that response might be more predictable.
Whether the law supplied any direction and whether the private
and social costs of the Act outweighed its benefits can be
ascertained by a closer examination of the statute.
IV.

THE STATUTE ON ITS FACE: FAILURES, OMISSIONS, AND PROBLEMS

Although the 1970 Act was an improvement over the 1966
legislation, defects remain within the law. This section will
analyze these deficiencies by studying the Act on its face and
illuminating the general as well as the specific faults.
This investigation alone, however, will not lead to an
accurate prediction of how the statute operates within the
context of ever-changing factors: e. g., politics, economics, business practices, costs, and the profits to be derived from air
pollution. An examination of these factors and the actual operation of the statutory agencies must supplement an analysis of
the statute itself and, therefore, will be included in Section V.
A.

Defects in the Statutory Scheme
Two of the 1970 Act's most glaring defects stem from omissions. Most obvious is the exclusion of the automobile from
legislative regulation. The Colorado Department of Health's Air
Pollution Report for 1971 reveals that pollution from mobile
sources accounts for up to 65 percent of the state's air pollution.35 The same report estimates that the quantity of air pollutants emitted from automobiles in the Denver metropolitan
center is sufficient to impair an individual's reaction time on a
typical Colorado day. 3"; More recently, it has been estimated
that 90.9 percent of the state's air pollution tonnage comes from
37
transportation sources.
Given these figures, it seems quite alarming that the legislature chose not to deal with the automobile in the 1970 Air
Pollution Control Act. How can this omission be explained?
One might speculate that the legislature was having a sufficiently difficult time attempting to control the identifiable pollution
of the few stationary sources and did not wish to compound the
35 REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
36 Id. at 12.
37 COLORADO BAR ASS'N, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 554-55

(1971).
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problem by attempting to curb the relatively invisible pollution
emitted by innumerable automobiles. One might also assume
that since the federal government had in 1970 amended the
Air Quality Act of 1967 to provide that all new cars had to meet
certain antipollution standards, 8 the Colorado legislature felt
that the responsibility for automobile pollution was Washington's. But perhaps the real reason for the failure to regulate
automobile pollution was the legislature's reluctance to squarely place the blame for a substantial proportion of Colorado's
air pollution on automobile owners. Such a determination would
have required car owners or drivers to either reduce their
driving time or to curtail the emission from their cars. The
legislature was probably reluctant to come to grips with the
politically explosive economic issue of forcing the Colorado
driver to spend more money on his automobile in order to decrease its emissions. Rather than face these issues, the legislature simply chose to ignore them. In so doing, it conveniently
excluded from the regulatory scheme one of the prime sources
of air pollution.3 9
38

42 U.S.C. § 1857-57 (e) (1970).

3 This omission is particularly inexcusable when one considers the fact
that Colorado is one of the few states which can legally control automobile-caused pollution without interfering with the Federal Air Quality
Act of 1967. This federal statute prohibits individual states from regulating air pollution from automobiles after 1967 unless the state already
has a statute that attempts to deal with the pollution caused by automobiles. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-157 (Supp. 1965), passed in the
waning days of the 1966 General Assembly, required a crankcase
ventilating system on all cars and trucks in Colorado. It was an admittedly toothless and overly broad statute which could never be enforced. Neverthless, it was part of the state's law and its existence would
have therefore allowed the state to develop its own clear air standards
for automobiles.
Colorado in 1972 finally began to address the problem of auto pollution. In the Governor's State of the State Message for 1972, Governor
Love concluded that the state needed "an effective motor vehicle emissions control and inspection program," although he made it clear that
the "problem of the internal combustion engine . . . demand[s] a national solution." State of the State Message of Governor John Love,
Jan. 10, 1972.
After the Governor's message, the Colorado legislature and the
various air pollution control agencies jumped on the auto-control
bandwagon. The Colorado House and Senate approved a resolution
calling for a year's study of air pollution caused by motor vehicles.
Denver Post, Feb. 22, 1972, at 18, col. 1. The Colorado Air Pollution
Control Commission held a public meeting Jan. 12, 1972, to discuss the
possible administrative adoption of a state-wide air quality "implementation" plan, which included the creation of an automobile-emissions inspection and control program. The meeting was held and the
draft of the plan discussed, but the result was far from satisfactory.
Environmentalists tore into the plan's provisions pertaining to auto
pollution control on several grounds. First, the plan cnly attempted to
deal with federal clean air standards, ignoring entirely the possibility
that the state could propose more stringent standards. Second, the plan
did not attempt to deal with the problems associated with pollution
emissions at Colorado's high altitude. This is not entirely the fault of the
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Another important omission was the legislature's failure to
statutorily create private remedies to be initiated by citizens.
Citizens who are dissatisfied with the progress of air pollution
abatement might wish to pursue their own private remedies.
Each individual is affected differently and each polluting source
is operated uniquely. Would it not, therefore, be more efficient
to grant the affected citizen the option of bypassing the public
enforcement scheme to seek his own sanction? The legislature
could have accomplished this through two techniques: first,
it could have granted the aggrieved citizens a statutory cause
of action based on private nuisance; 40 or second, it could have
state legislature as the Federal Clean Air Act has a ridiculous requirement which forbids making necessary engine adjustments on late-model
automobiles to reduce pollutant emissions at Colorado's altitude. Denver
Post, Mar. 18, 1972, at 46, col. 1. Third, the implementation plan relied
upon auto manufacturers to play a major role by 1975 in cleaning up
the air. Finally, although the plan did discuss the possibility of mass
transit as one strategy for reducing air polluticn, it rejected mass transit
on the basis that it would not be possible to develop except over a very
lengthy period of time. Colorado State Air Pollution Control Commission
hearings on state air pollution implementation plan, Jan. 12, 1972.

40

Thus, although someone had at last addressed the fact that the 1970
Act did not mention pollutants stemming from transportation sources,
the problem remains undented. Such efforts are too late and do not
propose good starting points from which this complex issue can be
faced. In a futile attempt to excuse a glaring omission with rhetoric,
the state has once again proved that it is still incapable of squarely
meeting the problem of the state's air pollution.
Section 23 of the 1970 Act does contain the following language:
Nothing in this article shall abridge or alter rights of action or
remedies now or hereafter existing, nor shall any provision of
this article ... be construed as estopping individuals . . . or duly
constituted political subdivisions of the state, from the exercise of their respective rights to suppress nuisances.

COLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 66-31-23 (Supp. 1971).

To understand the ineffectiveness of this section, however, one must
understand the common law concept of "nuisance" in Colorado.
The law of nuisance in Colorado is divided into two areas, Baughman
v. Cosler, 169 Colo. 534, 459 P.2d 294 (1969). A "private" nuisance occurs
when one individual is affected in a peculiar sense by another party. A
"public" nuisance occurs when there is an interference by another party
which detrimentally affects more than one individual. Echave v. Grand
Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P. 277 (1948). For a public nuisance to be
private also, it must occasion special damage to land owners different
from that suffered by the public in general. Platte & Denver Ditch
Co. v. Anderson, 8 Colo. 131, 6 P. 515 (1885). All these potential remedies
became unusable, however, under the famous Colorado decision of
Robinson Brick v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946). Robinson
Brick held that where the conduct of an offending party is sanctioned
by statute, an injunction based on nuisance will be denied. This means,
with respect to air pollution violations, that when a party is operating
under a variance pursuant to the provisions of he 1970 Act, his offensive
conduct is "sanctioned" by the statue and, therefore, cannot be prohibited by an injunction. This partially abrogates § 23 of the 1970 Act
because a private citizen has no private nuisance action in Colorado
whenever the violator is operating under a variance.
Hobbs v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1352 (Colo. 1972) limited Robinson Brick
to its facts and allowed an injunctive remedy based on nuisance per
accidens, even though the nuisance was pursuant to statute. However,
Hobbs held that Robinson Brick's rationale will still be applicable
whenever the statute permitting the nuisance had a foreseeable term-
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provided for special proceedings by private citizens to abate
nuisances in the name of the state. 41 Michigan's Environmental
Protection Act, 42 for example, clothes the private citizen with
the state's unexercised enforcement authority. A similar approach could have been adopted in Colorado as an alternative
strategy to governmental control of air pollution.
The Act may be criticized for what it does as well as for
what it fails to do. Through the creation of several governmental agencies-some of them overlapping, some of them in administrative limbo-the legislature fostered an incredibly complex
adjudicatory scheme in which the polluter is shunted through
several different agencies: the Division, the Commission, the
Board, and the Department of Health. These agencies point to
the existence of the polluter, tell him how badly he is polluting,
and decide whether to allow him to continue his pollution-causing activities. If these were the only functions of these agencies,
the process might be intelligible to the polluter. Unfortunately,
these four bodies are vested by both the Act and practical
necessity with several other functions. "Who should I turn to?"
is an oft-heard complaint by those who find themselves the
subject of the Act's regulatory and control scheme. "What
should I expect?" is the more relevant query, but, as will be
discussed later, this question is sometimes unanswerable.
The regulatory scheme is further complicated by the fact
that, in addition to the four state-level agencies, the Act specifically involves in the control program local governments,
the office of the state attorney general and the Colorado judiciary. These institutions perform various roles depending upon
the numerous pressures upon them at any particular time. They
ination point. This would be in the case of variances, whose provisions

41
42

apply for a definite period and have a finite termination point. See also
Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NATURAL REs. LAW. 475
(1970).
A second possibility would have been for the statute to allow state
officials to bring "public nuisance" actions against air pollution violators.
Without specifically allowing a state official to bring the public nuisance
action, the statute eliminated all chances for public nuisances suits in the
air pcllution field, for in Colorado, only a state may abate public
nuisances. Christianson v. Cecil, 109 Colo. 510, 127 P.2d 325 (1942).
There was, fortunately, a proposed bill before the 1972 Colorado legislature which gave district attorneys the power to enjoin "public nuisances" where public nuisance is defined as any "unlawful pollution of
land, water, or air." Unfortunately, district attorneys conceded that
this provision would probably be interpreted to mean that variances
granted to particular industries would be a defense to district attorney
action. Denver Post, Mar. 5, 1972, at 45, col. 4.
See Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38
U. CIN. L. REv. 587 (1969).
MICHi. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528 (201)- (207) (1970).
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add to the confusion primarily because their intended functions
are nowhere apparent on the face of the statute. Without the
benefit of experience within the process, a polluter is faced with
a myriad of governmental bodies and no clear avenue of
approach.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty apparent on the face of the
1970 Act is delay. Legislatively sanctioned delay is one of
the prime reasons why air pollution has not been abated and
has actually increased since the statute was enacted in 1970.
To underscore this point, and to clarify the confusing provisions of the statute which become operative whenever the
Division discovers a polluter, a hypothetical chain of events
may be useful. The procedure which shall be traced is that
which would be employed as a result of a particular company's
43
polluting the air in alleged violation of emission standards.
The hypothetical should expose three important aspects of the
1970 Act: the number of governmental, administrative, and
judicial bodies involved in enforcement; the complex procedure that must be followed before the Act's ultimate injunctive sanctions come into play; and why air pollution is a
problem to which Colorado's present Air Pollution Control
Act is an inadequate response.
With these objects in mind, let us assume that in July,
1970 Citizen C becomes annoyed by excessive smoke emanating
directly from Polluter P's smokestacks. Approximately 3
months later, C complains in writing to the State Air Pollution
Control Division. 44 Because the Act states that the Division
shall then cause a "prompt" investigation to be made, the
Division personnel make a personal inspection of the area
within a month. After recording their observations and studying the pollution at various times over a period of approximately 2 months, the Division concludes that P is in violation
of the Act and notifies both the violator and the Air Pollution
Control Commission in writing. Thereafter, the Division "diligently endeavor[s] to obtain voluntary abatement" 45 of the
alleged violation by working and consulting with P. Because P
does not have the economic resources to pay for antipollution
devices, because no apparatus has been designed which can
43 This hypothetical

is a compilation of approximately 30 actual cases
which have been involved with the Variance Board.
44 This assumes that the citizen knows where the complaint is filed. The
Act recognizes complaints only when filed with the Division. COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-13 (2) (Supp. 1971).
45

Id.
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curb its kind of pollution, or because it does not feel it is in
violation of the Act, there is no abatement. The Division is
now forced to issue a cease and desist order against P within
6 months of the initial notification of violation. Thus, 1 year
after C was originally annoyed by P's pollution, a cease and
desist order has finally been issued. This, unfortunately, is
only the beginning.
P now has two choices before it: it can either "cease and
desist from such violation" within 6 additional months," or it
can file a written request with the Air Polluton Control Commission appealing for a hearing to determine whether it is
entitled to a variance. P has 10 days after receipt of the cease
and desist order to file with the Commission.4 7 Once P has so
filed, the cease and desist order is stayed pending a final
determination.
In the event that P chooses to contest the alleged violation
of the Act, it so notifies the Commission which in turn refers
the question to the Variance Board. Within 15 days after the
hearing has been requested, the Variance Board grants the
request and sets a time and place for a meeting.4" Unfortunately, at this stage of the proceedings, the Act does not set
any time limit within which the Variance Board must meet with
the petitioning party. However, the normal practice is to set
a date not more than 6 months after the hearing has been
requested.
Let us assume, then, that P finally comes before the Variance Board 6 months after it originally filed its request for
a hearing and that the Board finds P in violation. P still has
30 days in which to ask the Commission to review the Variance
Board's findings, 4 and, after a decision by the Commission, P
may still appeal the issue to the state courts.50
Let us assume instead that P accepts that fact it is in
violation. The cease and desist order is stayed another 30 days
within which P may file a written request for a variance with
Invariably, the Commission refers this rethe Commission.'
quest to the Variance Board and the Board again has 15 days
to set a time and a place for the variance hearing.52 As with
46

Id. § 66-31-13 (3).

4

Id.§ 66-31-13 (4).

Id. § 66-31-16 (1).
(9).
0 Id. § 66-31-17 (1).
51 Id. § 66-31-13 (4).
52 Id. § 66-31-16.
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49Id. § 66-31-16
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the request for a hearing on the question of whether a violation exists, the Act places no time limits on when the Board
must schedule a meeting with the petitioning party. However,
it is customary for a requesting party to receive a hearing before the Variance Board within 6 months of its initial request.
Thus, over 2 years after C was first bothered by P's pollution,
the offending party is finally before the Variance Board on
the merits of whether it should receive a variance.
At the initial hearing before the Variance Board, either the
entire issue can be resolved, or, as more frequently happens,
the Variance Board may postpone its decision while P gathers
more information to present to the Board. In perhaps another
3 months, the Variance Board schedules another meeting with
P, which by that time has gathered enough information to
convince the Board that it should be given a 1-year variance.
During this 1-year respite from the law, let us assume that P
suffers financial difficulties and is not able to purchase the
required abatement equipment. When P meets with the Variance Board again after 1 year, its accomplishments in abating
its pollution are negligible. Subjected to increasing pressure
from the public, the Variance Board denies P's request for
an extension of its original variance. Nearly 31/2 years after
C was bothered by P's pollution, P has at last exhausted the
1970 Act's administrative delaying devices.
However, P is not yet finished. It still has 20 days from
the date of the Variance Board's final order to file for judicial
review in the district court for the district in which its air
contamination source is located1 3 After a filing for judicial
review, the original cease and desist order is again stayed.
The length of time which transpires before a petitioning party's
complaint is heard by a court varies from case to case, but very
conceivably 1 year may pass between the time of the variance
denial and the first court hearing. Furthermore, after the trial
of the case has finally ended, a court decision is usually not
forthcoming for another 2 months, and should the polluter
appeal the trial court decision to the court of appeals or
supreme court, up to 2 more years can pass without a final
54
resolution.
.V53
Id. § 66-31-17 (3).

,4 The case of Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams
County Dist. Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.
v. Colorado Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971);
argued June 20, 1972 was in Colorado courts for over 2 years.
The Fry Roofing case has been the only air pollution case to reach
the state supreme court. The court upheld the constitutionality of the
1970 Air Pollution Control Act and further held that it was "harmless
error" for a Variance Board member to introduce independently acquired evidence regarding a polluter's activities in a neighboring state.

1972

FAILURE OF STATE AIR POLLUTION

CONTROL

535

Under the 1970 Act, then, it is conceivable that 6 to 7
years can pass from the time of C's initial observation of and
discomfort from P's air pollution to a final court determination
on the matter. 55 Thus, it is not surprising that little improvement has been observed in the abatement of air pollution from
Colorado's stationary sources. The state's only affirmative
action to date, the enactment of the 1970 Air Pollution Control
Act, appears doomed to ineffectiveness because of its blatant
omissions and the dilatory practices it permits.
B. Defects in the Statute's Sections
If one confronts the statute's sections individually it becomes obvious that it has been inartfully drafted. There are
several instances where lack of clarity is responsible for delaying the final disposition of the polluter's case and for adding to
the confusion already engendered by the functional vagueness
of the various agencies provided for within the statute.
1. Enforcement
Section 13 is important because it elaborates the procedure
a polluter must follow once the Division has notified it of a
violation of the Commission's air pollution standards. After
the Division has issued a cease and desist order, section 13
allows the polluter to petition the Board for a variance. Most
polluters will do so as the mere request for a variance from
the Board automatically "stays" the operation of the cease and
desist order .5 Moreover, the lengthy hearing before the Variance Board, the variance which will likely be granted, the
petition for a re-hearing at the expiration of the variance, and
the appeal from a Board decision continue to stay the order.
Section 13's "staying" procedure is thus one of the most significant aspects of the 1970 Act. It creates a tremendous incentive for polluting parties to involve themselves with variance procedures as long as it is feasible. As a consequence, the
shutting down of polluting operations is postponed and the
abatement of air pollution is indefinitely delayed.
Another problem with section 13 is that it does not address
the question of what the Board should do when no cease and
desist order has been issued and the party voluntarily comes
before the Variance Board to present a proposed plan to the

55 The Public Service Company has been polluting the air while under a
variance for 6 years, and it has not yet brought an action in court.
56 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-13 (4) (Supp. 1971).
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Board for approval. 57 This omission has created confusion because section 13 allows for a variance request only after the
cease and desist order has been issued. Without a cease and
desist order, the petitioning party thus comes either within the
purview of section 12, which authorizes the Division to grant
permission to construct and install antipollution devices, 58 or
section 15, which authorizes the Variance Board to modify the
"enforcement" of any emission control regulation. 59
Further difficulties are encountered under section 13 because of its underlying assumption that the recipient of the
cease and desist order will clearly indicate to the Board whether
he elects to have the Board sit as a fact-finder and decide if a
violation exists or whether he wishes the fact of the violation
to be assumed. Unfortunately, the lack of familiarity with
section 13 on the part of petitioning parties often results in an
ambiguous choice by the party, confusing the Board as to
whether it should address itself to the issue of granting a
variance or whether it should determine if the party before
it is in violation of the Act."" A party before the Board may
not know what to do with respect to the question of the existence of a violation because he is generally unprepared before
the Board or because he does not recognize that the existence
of a violation can be at issue. Yet, it is important that the party
be notified of the consequences of admitting that he is in violation of state emission standards in order to avoid self-incrimina.57 This

has happened several times in the Variance Board's history and was
not clarified by the 1970 Act. It occurred because of the Department of
Health's urgings (Colorado State Hospital, Nov. 9, 1967); because the
polluter wants the Board to review a proposed system which is designed
to bring the company in compliance with the law (Colorado Springs
Martin-Drake Power Plant, Aug. 6, 1970); because the party is under
a local variance and it will be given a cease and desist order as soon
as it expires (Allied Chemical, Aug. 6, 1970); or because the Division
has not had a chance to issue the order yet (Thompson Pipe and Steel,
June 18, 1970).
The method of footnoting cases before the Board shall be as follows:
The proper name used is that of the polluter who is before the Board
at a hearing, decisionmaking meeting, or an informal discussion of the
case by the Board. If the Board or the Commission is noted, it refers to a
Board or Commission meeting. The dates which follow are the dates
when the Board met for the hearing or to decide the case. Dates may
also refer to letters sent or received by the Board or Division and will
be identified as such. The numbers which may follow the date refer to
the page numbers for the particular transcript record where the cited
material can be found. If no page numbers follow the date, it is either
because the hearing was attended by the author or the Board meeting
was to decide a variance request, in which case no official transcript was
recorded. The transcripts, decisionmaking deliberations, and lettersmemoranda relevant to the cited cases may be found under the name of
the party and appropriate date in the Variance Board files at the Air
Pollution Control Division, State Department of Health.
58
1971).
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-12 (4) (Supp.
5 Id. § 66-31-15 (1) (a).
60Banner Wrecking Co., July 6, 1966 at 35-36. In such cases the Board
often refers to the legal counsel provided by the Office of the Attorney
General.
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tion problems. Once he admits being in violation, he is later
estopped from raising this issue on appeal6i
It might be useful to consider abolishing the Board's function as a fact-finder on the violation issue altogether. This is
because petitioning parties may feel, however inaccurately, that
by contesting the violation they are risking the possibility of
harsher treatment from the Board on the eventual variance
determination.
2.

The Variance Board

Section 14 of the 1970 Act defines the Board's composition
as follows: (a) one member designated by the State Board
of Health; (b) one registered professional engineer not from
industry; (c) one physician or toxicologist not from industry;
(d) three members from industry; and (e) three members
from the public at large. This statutory composition was obviously designated to make the Board a representative body
of all the interests which might possibly appear before it. The
state is represented by three citizens from the public at large,
and business is represented by three members from industry.
One difficulty with the Board's composition is that the
various interests represented by its members might constitute
something other than a fair and impartial tribunal. The United
States Supreme Court has declared that an administrative
agency exercising quasi-judicial powers, such as the Board,
must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality.62 Although this requirement of impartiality has not
been taken to mean that the agency must be indifferent to
results, it nevertheless raises questions as to the statutorily defined "interests" Board members apparently represent.
Another difficulty with the Board's present composition
is that the Act does not provide for enough Board members
with needed expertise. The most obvious example of this shortcoming is that the statute requires that only one engineer be
on the Board. Considering the fact that the crucial point of
almost every hearing is the feasibility of a proposed abatement plan, one statutorily required engineer is not sufficient to
adequately judge the often elaborate antipollution schemes
61 See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951). The Floyd Acceptances,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868); Stockstom v. C.I.R., 190 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.
1951). See also City & County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289,
310 P.2d 296 (1957); K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
17.03, 17.06 (1958).
62 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Escoe v. Zubst,
295 U.S. 490 (1935).
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of petitioning parties. Adequate evaluation necessitates a number of engineers from industry and the public-at-large to serve
as checks on the petitioning party's technological testimony.
An additional kind of expertise which is currently altogether
absent from the Board is legal training and experience. Although the Commission and the State Board of Health have
attorneys as members, the Variance Board does not. The inclusion of lawyers in its membership would enable the Board
to make more independent judgment on questions of law which
are presently beyond its understanding, and would place it
on a more equal footing with the polluting party, who is almost
always represented by legal counsel.
Another interesting and important problem is presented
by the section 14 quorum requirements. Section 14 provides that
five members of the nine-man Variance Board constitute
a quorum; but at the same time, and against the recommendations of various governmental bodies, it requires the concurrence of at least a majority of all members for a final determination. 3 This latter requirement has been interpreted to mean
that if a bare five-man quorum shows up at any meeting, a
unanimous vote of those present is required to render a binding
decision. Failing unanimity, the hearing must be rescheduled
in the hopes that more members will appear at the next meeting. At any such subsequent meeting the entire proceeding must
be repeated since members who were absent at the original
hearing would otherwise be ineligible to vote. An obvious solution to these difficulties would be to allow a majority of the
quorum to make a conclusive determination for the entire
Board. This solution, however, was rejected by the legislature.
There are, however, two extra-legislative solutions to the
problem presented by the section 14 quorum requirements. The
Board could provide that, although a member may not have
been present at a previous hearing, all he must do to qualify
to vote on the matter discussed at the prior meeting is review
the transcript. This would result in speeding up the decisionmaking process by reducing the number of hearings. Such an
approach is probably legally justifiable. The leading Supreme
64
Court case in this area, Morgan v. United States, has required
merely that in order for an administrative decision to be valid
61 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-14 (5) (d) (Supp. 1971).
See also WIBC v. FCC, 259 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.
64 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
1958); Joyce v. Brockman, 257 App. Div. 795, 15 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1939).
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the "one who considers the facts which underlie the order must
have considered evidence or argument." 65 Thus, the Board need
open the hearing for "evidence only" whenver a quorum of
five is not present. The Board might also have the petitioner
acquiesce on the record to this procedure. When the party
before the Board has agreed beforehand to this procedure, he
can be said to waive his right to subsequently object to the
votes of absent members of the Board.
Another possible solution to quorum attendance problems
may be found in the 1970 Act's alternate provisions. The governor is required to appoint alternates to the Board who could
theoretically act as official Board members when the members
for whom they are alternates fail to appear. 6 However, though
reasonable on its face, this solution could lead to other problems. It could conceivably result in the existence of two separate
Boards-the regular Variance Board and the Board of alternates.
Assuming an issue was not decided on the day that the alternate attended, the provision might require the alternate to
attend all subsequent Board meetings on that subject so that
he would still be eligible to vote. A court might also decide
that because an alternative system had been provided by
statute, a system allowing Board members to render a decision
on the basis of the record alone would be invalid. A court
might further hold that the Board is under an obligation to
call in alternates in the event of foreknown absences of some
Board members in order to always operate at full nine-man
strength. An additional problem is that section 14 does not
state whether alternates must fall within the same statutory
category as the regular members of the Board whom they replace. Thus, all the alternates could be from industry or from
the public at large.
3.

Variances

Section 15 articulates the grounds upon which the Board
is able to grant a variance. The Act provides that the Board
"may" grant a variance when (a) control techniques are not
available, (b) compliance with emission control regulations
would create an unreasonable economic burden, and (c) the
granting of the variance would be consistent with the legislative policy of the Act. 67 If a petitioning party can prove any
65298 U.S. 468, 470 (1936).

The Colorado Supreme Court followed the

Morgan rationale in Big Top, Inc. v. Hoffman, 156 Colo. 362, 399 P.2d

249 (1965).
66

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.

67 Id. § 66-31-15 (1).

§ 66-31-14 (3)

(Supp. 1971).
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of these three conditions, then the Board has the right, but not
the obligation, to grant a variance. It should be obvious that
it is not difficult to fall within these categories. Absolutely
effective control techniques are rarely available; the legislative
policy of the Act is vague enough so that it is not an impediment to the granting of a variance; 8 and antipollution devices are expensive enough to fall within the "unreasonable
economic burden" category. 9
Section 15 also provides that the Board "shall" grant a
variance when it determines that there would otherwise be
"an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or . . .the
practical closing of any lawful business or activity and such
7' 0
would be without sufficient corresponding public benefit.
This language contains an apparent contradiction of terms. If
a party is violating the Act, it is not really a "lawful" business.
Thus, since the petitioning party is not "lawful" within section
15, the Board may arguably deny a variance regardless of the
possibility of a "closing."
4. Hearings
Section 16 sets down the broad rules of procedure within
which the Board must operate. Unfortunately, section 16 has
many shortcomings, often making it difficult for the Board to
act effectively. Subsection (1), for example, provides that
within 15 days after a hearing has been requested, the Variance
Board shall grant such a request and set a time and place for
the meeting. As previously mentioned, the section does not
set a time limit within which the Board must schedule a meeting with the requesting party and thereby creates the possibility of a cease and desist order being stayed indefinitely.
Subsection (1) also fails to explain what kind of "notice" should
be given the petitioning party once a date has been fixed. In
the past, this omission has resulted in a failure to properly notify
parties as to what to expect before the Variance Board. 71 The
consequence of this lack of notice is that the party is often
unprepared and that the hearing must be rescheduled for a
later date.
Id. § 66-31-2. The 1970 Act did eliminate the language of the 1966 Act
providing that the policy of Colorado is to further "the industrial
development of the state," and thus at least this aspect of legislative
policy is no longer available to the polluter.
69 The "economic burden" condition of § 15 was condemned by environmentalists as weakening the Act by making variances too easy to
obtain. Denver Post, Mar. 15, 1970, at 18, col. 1.
68

70
71

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

66-31-15 (2)

(Sum. 1971).

Banner Wrecking Co., July 6, 1966, at 10; Rio Grande County Bd. of
County Comm'rs, Feb. 17, 1972.
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Subsection (4) insures that information relating to secret
processes, methods of manufacture or production need not be
publicly disclosed at the hearing.7 2 The main difficulty with
subsection (4) is that it does not clearly indicate the kinds of
information about which the Board may legally inquire. This
failure has caused confusion in the past when the Board has
asked for financial and business data from the petitioning party
and the latter has objected not on grounds of confidentiality,
but on grounds of irrelevancy. 73 It seems that subsection (4)
must be clarified so that the Board can know the proper scope
of its inquiry. However, the best solution would be to allow
the Board to freely question the petitioning party about all
aspects of that party's operations which may be relevant to
pollution control.
It is subsection (5) which is in greatest need of clarification. This section purports to define when a person may become a "party" to the Variance Board hearing. By statute, only
the petitioning party and the Division are original parties to
the hearing. Subsection (5) was included in the Act in order
to give members of the public the right to be heard, to present
and cross-examine witnesses, and to seek judicial review of
Variance Board decisions.74 The difficulty with subsection (5)
is that the conditions for becoming a party to the hearing, as
articulated in the Act, are far too ambiguous:
Any person who is affected by the proceeding and whose interests are not already adequately represented, shall have the
opportunity to be a party thereto upon prior application to and
approval by the Variance Board or Commission, in its sole
discretion, as deemed reasonable and proper by said Variance
75
Board.

On its face, the language of the subsection does not specify
(a) what is required for a person to be "affected by the proceeding;" (b) when that person's interests are "already adequately represented;" (c) whether "interests" refers to a private
individual interest or the interest of the public-at-large; (d) how
72

§ 66-31-16 (4) (Supp. 1971).
Rock Wool. May 8, 1967, at 48.
7vThough subsection (5) does not include the right to judicial review,
§ 17(2) allows "any party" to move a court to "remand" the case
once it has been the subject of judiical review. Section 17(1) makes
all Variance Board decisions subject to judicial review but omits to
state who shall have the right to so appeal. Arguably, since subsection
(2) speaks in terms of "party" insofar as remanding a case which has
been appealed to the courts, this same party must have had the right
to ask for judicial review under subsection (1) of § 17. Furthermore,
'"party" presumably refers to those persons having been made a party
to the hearing.
75COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-16 (5)
(Supp. 1971).
73

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
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soon "prior to" the hearing the application must be submitted;
(e) when the Board "shall" grant a person "party" status if
he fulfills the statutory conditions; and (f) whether the Board
may still deny the application for "party" status to a person
meeting the three conditions "in its sole discretion." Nor does
subsection (5) address itself to these issues: (a) If a new party
is admitted, should the Board begin the hearing again so that
the new party has an opportunity to cross-examine all the
witnesses who have testified before the Board previously?
(b) Should the voting on admission be in open session so
that all interested parties have the right to object? (c) Does
"sole discretion" as used in subsection (5) mean that the Board
can in its sole discretion decide whether a person's interests
are already adequately represented or does it mean that the
Board can in its sole discretion decide whether to admit a
party? (d) If a party is admitted, can it then broaden the
issues concerning the case before the Board?
The poor draftsmanship in subsection (5) raises many
sensitive questions. First, one of the effects of allowing an outside interest to be a party to the variance hearing is that, as
a party, he may ask for a continuance of the hearing. Such
action would have the effect of further delaying final resolution of the case-a result the new party would presumably not
desire. Second, when a member of the public applies for "party"
status, the Board is faced with making a decision as to whether
the party's interests are "already adequately represented." In
making this decision, the Board must realize that there are
two potential and widely divergent "interests" at stake in any
hearing. On the one hand, there are the special interests of
the particular group of individuals petitioning for party status.
On the other, there are the broader and more general interests
of the public-at-large. These two interests may be incompatible
at times, and therefore, it is necessary for the Board to decide
whether the persons petitioning to be made "parties" are claiming that their private or that the public's general interest is
not adequately represented at the hearing. For if the interest
is really "public," then the Board is faced with the statutory
presumption that the public's interest is adequately represented
by the Department of Health's Air Pollution Control Division
and its legal counsel. Thus, if the interest affected is that of
the general public, and if the Board admits the new party, it
will be implicity deciding that the Division is not adequately
representing the public's interest. The Board understandably
wants to avoid making this kind of resolution.
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It should be clear from the above that subsection (5) is in
serious need of revision. Although the Board has attempted on
occasion to solve the question of the subsection's confusing
language through it own set of rules, 6 and although a recent
Colorado Supreme Court case has upheld the Board's power to
allow interested persons to become parties, 7 a clearly articulated expression of legislative intent should be forthcoming.
Otherwise, the Board may spend too much of its precious time
dealing with questions that it has no legal authority to answer.
5.

Judicial Review

Section 17 provides for judicial review of "any final order
or determination by the Variance Board, the Division, or the
Commission. 7 8s The problem with section 17 is that it does not
state who is able to file for judicial review. Obviously, the party
who had applied for the variance can file, and, according to
section 16 (2), the Division is given the right to obtain judicial
review. But does a person who has been admitted as a party
to the hearing also have that right? The Act is strangely silent
on this point. Arguably, since subsection (2) of section 17 allows
"any party" to move the court to remand cases back to the
Variance Board, it might follow that "any party" also has the
right to appeal a Variance Board decision to the courts. Since
the Act fails to define "party," it presumably includes any party
to the variance hearing. 7 Section 17 explicitly provides that a
party petitioning for a variance may only appeal Variance
Board decisions which are "final." This precludes the possibility of delaying the proceedings by appealing minor Variance
Board rulings before an actual decision is rendered.8 0
As a final observation, section 17 does not require a party
to exhaust his administrative review remedies (an appeal to
the Commission) before he files for judicial review, although
the judiciary could easily require compliance with this procedure as a condition precedent to court review.8 '
76 At the Fry Bros. Roofing hearing, July 16, 1970, the Board conditioned

party status on whether it was represented by legal counsel, the nature
and extent of the perceived harm, and the information which the party
might offer to the Board.
77
Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist.
Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado
Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971), argued
June 20, 1972.
78
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-17 (1) (Supp. 1971).
79 This. in fact, has been the interpretation given § 17 by the Variance
Board in dealing with the rights of persons petitioning to be made a
party before the Board even though "party" could be construed to
mean "party to the court litigation."
80 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 153 (1965).
S Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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6. Injunctions
Section 18 is potentially the most important section of the
1970 Act. It allows a court to enjoin the operation of any polluting source which is in violation of a Commission standard.
The difficulty with this procedure is that the Board does not
itself have the power to enforce its decisions or orders. If the
Board denies a variance request or renders a present variance
null and void for failure of the polluter to satisfy a condition
to the variance, it does not follow that an injunctive proceeding
will begin. Instead, the cease and desist order must become
operative, the polluter must fail to comply with the order, the
Commission must request the district attorney to bring the
injunctive suit, and the district attorney must find the requisite
time to bring the action before any court order can be issued
against the polluter. The effectiveness of section 18 is therefore contingent upon the Commission's willingness to request
that the local district attorney prosecute the violators. The
legislature diluted the effectiveness of the Act by failing to
provide that the prosecution of air pollution violators under
section 18 be mandatory.
7. Local Government-Authority-Penalty
The last provision in the Act which contains areas of uncertainty is section 25, which attempts to define the relationship
between cities, towns, and counties on the one hand and the state
on the other. Its language, unfortunately, leaves this important
relationship unclarifed. Subsection (1) commands that no
variance permit issued under local air pollution law shall be
construed to relieve the holder from his duty to comply with
any emission control regulations adopted pursuant to the Act,
nor will it relieve the Division from its duty to enforce such
regulations.12 This wording of subsection (1) indicates that the
Act is meant to override all local air pollution laws or policies,
including local variance board decisions, which are inconsistent
with those promulgated under the Act. Subsection (3), however, makes it clear that "application, operation, and enforcement of valid local air pollution laws shall be completely independent of, but may be concurrent with, the application, operation, and enforcement of this article. '8 3 Therefore, the Act
seems to vest authority in two independent government bodies,
thereby permitting the party applying for a state variance to
be caught in between, and perhaps subject to two inconsistent
decisions.
82
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-25 (1) (Supp. 1971).
83Id. § 66-31-25 (3).
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The best resolution of this uncertainty is to rely on the
Act's investiture of ultimate authority in the state board. 4 This
permits the Board to grant and deny state variances without
being bound by any local variance or decision passed with respect to the polluter, thereby furthering the policy of the Act.
However, given the language of subsection (4) of section 25,
it is not altogether certain that this was the intention of the
legislature. What the legislature probably meant to do was
allow enforcement of either the state or local rule, depending
upon which was more rigorous and restrictive. What is needed
is a legislative clarification of this ambiguity, or, if this is not
forthcoming, a comprehensible opinion letter from the Attorney General. 85
8.

Summary

It should be obvious that the defects of the 1970 Act are
numerous. The legislature failed to define functions and procedures. Part of the failure stems from draftsmanship. Part is
a result of the hurried enactment of the Act because of the
pressing need to have updated air pollution legislation. However, the statute's shortcomings are also due to the legislature's
unwarranted assumption that, if given enough discretion, those
charged with enforcing the statute will be able to effect a
compromise which abates air pollution and satisfies the various
needs of the interested parties. The validity of this assumption
will be the subject next examined.
V. TBE Am POLLUTION PROBLEM IN PRACTICE
By 1970, Colorado had reached a stage where the polluter,
the affected citizen, and the legislature had experienced a sequence of realizations and reactions which resulted in the enactment and re-enactment of a faulty air pollution control statute.
First, there was the fact of air pollution: its nature, increasing
gravity, and subtle ironies. Second, there was a growing awareness of the problem's existence, an identification of its causes,
and a nagging need to make a decision about how to correct
these causes. When it was determined that the market could
not function by itself to bring about an abatement of air
pollution, attention was logically focused on the law as a way
84 Thompson Pipe & Steel, June 18, 1970. This has been at the advice of
legal counsel to the Board.
85 In 1966 the Colorado Attorney General attempted to clarify the jurisdiction of local and state air pollution agencies, but the opinion was too

ambiguous for the Variance Board or its legal staff to understand.
Opinion letter from Attorney General Duke Dunbar to Alan Sternberg,
Littleton, Colorado, City Attorney, Aug. 27, 1968. As late as summer
1970, the Variance Board and the Division were asking the Attorney
General to clarify his original opinion letter.
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of implementing some kind of government action which could
solve the pollution problem. Within the law, it was decided
that a formal legislatively initiated response to the problem
was more appropriate than an "informal" citizen-initiated court
remedy. The eventual product was the Air Pollution Control
Act of 1966 which was updated in 1970. As we have seen, the
mere fact of its existence was significant. It provided for the
temporary appeasement of the Colorado public's discomfort over
air pollution effects; it placed the polluter on notice that governmental mechanisms were about to interfere with his private
decisionmaking; and it established the Colorado legislature as
a body which could and would respond to the fact of environmental problems. But, as discussed in Section IV, the language
of the statute is indicative of legislative non-concern over important aspects of the form and function of the legal institutions responsible for cleaning up the state's air. It also reveals
a seeming disregard for one of the prime causes of air pollution-transportation sources-as well as a tendency to sanction
a myriad of delaying tactics.
We will now examine how the various bodies operating
pursuant to this statute have fared. Inherent difficulties in
the legislative framework aside, the legal institutions involved
in pollution control have failed to respond to the pollution
crisis in imaginative ways which could have furthered the
statute's policy or at least maintained its viability. In addition, several practical problems have arisen to frustrate both
the efforts of the institutions to enforce the Act and the ability
of the polluter to achieve compliance.
A.

The Failure of Legal Institutions
1. The Variance Board
a.

Lack of Standards

The fundamental failing of the Variance Board is its passivity. It appears to consider itself a mere granter of variances
rather than an active and powerful arm of pollution control.
This self-image is especially unfortunate since the Board is the
only state agency with the power to exercise detailed control
over the abatement efforts of every polluter discovered by the
Division. The source of this power is the Board's ability to terminate the variance, which in turn reactivates the cease and
desist order. The price of a stay of the cease and desist order
should be high. If the Board developed comprehensive and
intelligible standards against which to measure variance peti-
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tions, then every polluter would be forewarned that he must
devise a plan in compliance therewith or be denied a variance.
Being forewarned, a polluter who is capable of effective abatement would be quite unlikely to risk the immediate enforcement of the cease and desist order which would follow an
emptyhanded appearance before the Board.
Unfortunately, no such standards have been formulated. The
Board has functioned as a receptacle for petitions which are
judged without reference to any discernible long-range policy.
Its only attempt to supply a standard took the form of six
"conditions . . . among those to be considered in granting a
variance."86; These guidelines are so general and uninformative
as to the internal workings of the Board that they are of
negligible practical value.
There are several adverse effects which result from the
failure of the Board to articulate standards. Most importantly,
because the Board does not offer clear grounds for its decisions,
courts and reviewing agencies do not have a substantive foundation upon which to attack the Board's reasoning. This, of course,
is desirable from the Board's point of view. If there are no
rules or precedents to be followed, no Board decision can be
successfully attacked on the basis of bias, inconsistency, or
unequal application of the air pollution control law. When no
comparisons are possible, the Board can operate in a relative
vacuum, free from accusations by polluter and public alike.
However, the Boards failure to establish standards is subject
to legal attack. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that "the orderly functioning of the process of review requires
that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted
be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."87 Otherwise,
there is little basis for effective judicial review.88 As the Supreme Court stated in Secretary of Agriculture v. United
States,'! an administrative decision will be remanded when the
86These were:

(1) potential danger of emissions, (2) respondent's (the
polluter's) good faith, (3) specific proposal for abatement, (4) past
performance, (5) contribution to the community, and (6) availability of
technology. Operational Guidelines of the Air Pollution Variance Board,
approved by the Air Pollution Control Commission, Aug. 27, 1970.
The Board rarely recognizes the distinction between the statutory
grounds for granting or denying variances found in § 15 of the Act.
Subsection (1) provides that the Board "may" grant variances in certain factual contexts but subsection (2) requires that the Board "shall"
grant variances if it determines that another set of conditions are
present. The most the Board will articulate is that it has found no
"corresponding public benefit" which would result from a denial of a
variance. But how the Board defines "public benefit" is unknown.
87 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
88Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). See also Geer v.
Stathopalos, 135 Colo. 1, 309 P.2d 606 (1957).
89 347 U.S. 645 (1954).
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administrative body has not "explained its decision with the
simplicity and clearness through which a halting impression
ripens into reasonable certitude."90
One adverse effect of the Board's proclivity to make its
decisions independent of external standards is that Board decisions are unpredictable. This makes it virtually impossible
for the party before the Board to be prepared to state an
effective case. Moreover, it has resulted in the Board rendering
inconsistent opinions with respect to polluters who are in
essentially the same economic position, as well as being charged
with identical violations of the Act."1 Another immediate result of this confusion is delay. The polluter often does not know
what is expected of him at a hearing and consequently does
not bring the appropriate information. The hearing must be
postponed while the polluter performs a task which should
have been completed well before his initial appearance.
The Board is no more aggressive once the hearing gets
under way. The individual Board members, who are in essence
volunteers, rarely have sufficient knowledge of the particular
case or of the technological and economic problems involved
to ask probing questions or make a thoroughly informed judgment as to the feasibility of the proposed abatement program.
Their decision is frequently based on the unchallenged presentation of the petitioner who has an obvious interest in
painting an unrealistically favorable picture.
b. The Unjustified Fear of Taking
Perhaps even more significantly, the Board has timidly
responded to polluters because of its two-fold fear of losing
jurisdiction over the polluter through denial of a variance and
of having its decision reversed on appeal as a "taking" of private
property. 2 This fear stems from an irrational misunderstanding
of law and the legal process. The Board's loss of jurisdiction
through denial of a variance can only have a positive result if
the continuance of variances results in the polluter being able
to continue to pollute ad infinitum without concerning itself
with the cease and desist order. Moreover, should the Board lose
jurisdiction to the courts, the judiciary is far more likely than
the Board to terminate the pollution by issuing an injunction.
Furthermore, court decisions can supply needed legal precedents
90 Id. at 654.

91 Compare the cases of Luria Bros., May 7, 1970, Ideal Cement, July 2,
1970, and Fry Bros. Roofing, July 19, 1970.
92 Section 15 (2) specifically requires the Board to grant the variance
whenever there would otherwise be "an arbitrary and unreasonable
taking of property or practical closing of any lawful business or activity." (emphasis added).
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which might reduce some of the confusion surrounding the law
of air pollution control.
If the fear of losing control over a party's particular pollution-causing activity is not a valid reason for the granting of
a variance, neither should be the fear that a denial might be
viewed by a reviewing court as a legal taking of property.
There are several sound legal reasons for concluding that the
Board is far too intimidated by the "taking" prohibition. Significantly, the Act provides the Board with a means of circumventing the restriction against "takings" by enabling the Board
to make the preliminary determination of whether a "public
benefit" will, in any case, outweigh the closing of the business.9 3 This broad grant of discretion gives the Board the right
to deny variances, knowing that the denial may well result in
a "closing," as long as it believes that there will be a corresponding public benefit resulting from the cessation of the
polluting activity.
In addition to this statutory escape clause, there are three
other legal doctrines which support a construction of the statute
permitting variance denials even when there is a closing of a
polluter's business. First, it is settled that the government can
control uses of land under its "police powers" without there
being a fifth amendment "taking." 94 For example, in Hadacheck
v. Sebastian95 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead"G the United
States Supreme Court upheld on the basis of the police power
two city ordinances which flatly prohibited activities which
the plaintiffs had lawfully conducted prior to the adoption of
the ordinances. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
these prohibitions represented "takings without compensation"
and ex post facto legislation. State courts have taken a similar
stance97 even where the practical value of the land is completely destroyed." This line of cases stands squarely in support
of the Board's statutory authority to close down polluting businesses if the circumstances require. All that the Board need do
is determine that a "corresponding public benefit" will be
gained from the reduction in pollution.
§ 66-31-15 (2) (Supp. 1971).
94Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska. 164 U.S. 403 (1876) makes the 5th
amendment's "taking" clause applicable to the states.
95 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
116369 U.S. 590 (1962).
97E.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
98 Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206
N.E.2d 666 (1965).
9- COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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Zoning laws and cases provide a second body of authority
which supports the conclusion that the Board can avoid the
Act's requirement that variances be granted whenever there
would be a practical closing or taking resulting from a variance
denial. When zoning ordinances are initially adopted to limit
permissible uses of property, or, in a situation more comparable
to air pollution laws, when property is rezoned so as to prevent
uses of property previously allowed, some protection is provided the owners of property then using their premises in a
forbidden manner. This protection takes the form of a grant of
an exception to the general zoning plan for prior nonconforming uses. Similarly, polluting operations are "protected" under
the 1970 Air Pollution Control Act only because they existed
prior to its enactment and only because the Variance Board
has decided to carve out an exception to the Act in certain
instances. Section 15(2)'s prohibition against variance denials
which result in practical closings of "lawful business(es)" is
thus not really an unsurmountable restriction, for these businesses are "lawful" in a very tenuous sense. They are lawful
only because their polluting operations preceded the enactment
of air pollution control laws, and should the Board, Commission,
or state legislature decide to remove the protection, they would
no longer be lawful within the meaning of the statute. The
courts have made it clear in zoning cases that "where the benefit to the public has been deemed of greater moment than
the detriment to the property owner, we have sustained the
prohibition of continuation of prior nonconforming uses. 1'
Likewise, the Variance Board seems legally capable of terminating a polluting business' lawful status whenever it feels
that the public interest would thereby be benefited.
Reference to nuisance theory provides a third ground upon
which to base the denial of a variance. A "public nuisance"
exists whenever there is an invasion of the public interest due
to activities which endanger or interfere with the health, safety,
property, or comfort of a considerable number of people. By
utilizing the concept of public nuisance as a tool for land use
control, local and state governments have been able to restrict
or entirely eliminate those activities which substantially interfere with the interests of other landowners. " ) The 1970 Act is
99 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42, 176 N.Y.
S.2d 598 (1958).
"00 See Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106,
169 P.2d 171 (1946),
where the court held that the State of Colorado and County of Arapahoe had pre-empted the field of public nuisance as it related to the
case. See also note 40 supra.
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arguably nothing more than an exercise of the state's legislative
power to control public nuisances. If this be so, the Board may
safely restrict or cause the termination of air pollution activities which interfere with common public rights without concerning itself with the possibility of there being a "taking." 10 1
c. Other Board Defects
This is not to say that the Board should never grant a variance. If the polluter can demonstrate that the variance will
be put to its intended use-a grace period during which he can
achieve compliance-then it is clearly in the best interest of
the public to preserve a going business. However, the granting
of a variance should not mean the cessation of Board involvement until the variance has expired. The Board is empowered
to impose conditions on a variance and to order revocation
if any of those conditions are not fulfilled. 10 2 Almost every
variance is granted on the conditions that the polluter take
measures leading to abatement and that he submit periodic
progress reports. Although polluters often fail to fulfill these
conditions or merely satisfy them in a haphazard fashion, only
in the most extreme cases are variances revoked. The potential
for continuing control inherent in the power to condition is
thus lost through nonenforcement.
Finally, the Board's general attitude with respect to the
public is defective. In the past, the Board has only reacted to
pressure, while never initiating positive action on its own. It
has waited for the public's outrage to motivate the state legislature to initiate legislative reforms; it has excused its lack
of effectiveness in curbing pollution on the grounds that it is
straitjacketed by the statute's "taking" prohibition, and it has
remained in limbo assuming that a changing tenor of the times
will eventually allow it to do more. Such an attitude is selfdefeating. Public opinion will not be aroused until a catalyst
is introduced in its midst. Since the legislature refuses to
supply it, pressure for technological advances, financial commitment, and changing public attitudes toward air pollution
101 See, e.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118

1

P. 928 (1911). Also there is another more practical consideration which
weighs against the possibility that Board action may cause a practical
taking. Before a Board denial of a variance results in the closing of
a polluter, four contingencies must occur. The polluting party must
refuse to subsequently abate its air pollution violation, the Commission
must uphold the Board's variance denial, the Office of the Attorney
General must vigorously prosecute the violation of the cease and desist
order, and a reviewing court must enforce it. None of these events are
assured, especially the last.
(Supp. 1971).
2 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-15 (4)
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must come from a body such as the Variance Board. Its centrally located position in the overall scheme of the Air Pollution Control Act makes it the prime candidate for stimulating
public demand for clean air measures. Its power to deny variances, to grant them under rigid conditions, and to initiate
court cases puts it in the forefront of air pollution control.
More importantly, it is a regulator disguised as a judicial court
and, therefore, its activities are clothed in absolute legitimacy.
The potential for leadership is present; all the Board need do
is actualize it.
2.

The Air Pollution Control Division

Once the polluter is before the Variance Board, the 1970
Act specifically grants party status to the Division and gives it
the power to furnish such personnel to the Board as may be
required. 10 3 Beyond these provisions, however, the Act is silent
with respect to the relationship of the Division to the state
Variance Board. This gives the Division considerable latitude
to define its own role in Board proceedings. The current role
is minimal. Although represented by legal counsel, the Division
inevitably refuses to take an adversary position in variance
hearings. Objections to statements or conclusions by the petitioner are rarely offered. More importantly, the Division does
not present affirmative testimony based on independent investigation to serve as a countervailing factor to the polluter's
presentation. These failings become particularly obvious when
the Board is confronted with evidence of a highly technical
nature. The Division's engineers often lack sufficient time to
evaluate proposed control techniques and are consequently
unable to answer the Board's technical questions. In such a
case, the Board has no satisfactory way to evaluate the soundness of a petitioner's abatement plan.
In a larger context, the' Division has been ineffective because it has been saddled with pressing demands and limited
resources. There is, of course, a manpower and financial shortage. But more significantly, there is an unreasonable time demand placed upon the Division. To qualify for state and federal funding the Division must spend up to one-half its man
hours preparing reports and compiling largely useless data
regarding staff composition, monies expended, and day-by-day
activities to "justify" its existence in Colorado. This combination
of public relations and lobbying for continued funding accomplishes little in the way of eliminating air pollution.
103 Id. § 66-31-16.
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3. The Colorado Judiciary.
The Colorado courts' participation in the state's air pollution control program suffers from the same faults that the
Division experiences: internal failings and external demands.
An area of internal difficulty is the overzealous concern of the
judiciary with absolute procedural regularity. This is especially
true where a Colorado district court is called upon to review
the enforcement procedures employed by the Division. In
three cases brought before reviewing courts after cease and
desist orders had been issued by the Division, the courts voided
the orders on the grounds that the Division had not taken
reasonable steps towards advising, counseling, and investigating
the polluting parties before the orders were issued.1 04 The immediate effect of these decisions was to allow the polluters'
operations to continue even though they were in express
violation of the air pollution control statute.
Despite their tendency to decide on the basis of procedural
matters, reviewing courts have occasionally had the opportunity to review the merits of Variance Board decisions. At
times these courts have merely upheld the Board's determination. 105 At other times, however, they have either misconstrued
the meaning of the Board's order to the polluter, or have interjected themselves in the decision on a matter peculiarly within
the Board's expertise.' "" While a reviewing court may review
the evidence presented before an administrative agency to determine whether the agency has acted correctly, 10 7 it is not
prudent for it to substitute its judgment for that of the Board
on matters with which it is unfamiliar.
The most obvious problem with judicial review of agency
decisions is the time involved in obtaining a final decree. It
usually requires between 1 and 2 years to obtain a ruling
from the district court and, in the event of an appeal, another
State v. Specken, Civil No. 54970 (Pueblo County Dist. Ct. 1967); East
Side Lumber Co. v. Colorado Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 18466
(Larimer County Dist. Ct. 1970); Colorado Dept. of Health v. Zupan,
Civil No. 66693 (Pueblo County Dist. Ct. 1971).
105 Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist.
Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado
Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971); argued
June 20, 1972.
10G Frank Cook, E. Side Lumber Co. v. Colorado Air Pollution Variance
Bd., Civil No. 18466 (Larimer County Dist. Ct. 1970). The Court here
concluded that the time period allowed the polluter by the Board to
install control equipment was unreasonably short. The court also misinterpreted the Board's decision to mean that the polluting party only
had 3 months to completely abate its air pollution violation when in
fact the Board had only requested that the polluter furnish the Board
with a realistic "plan" within 3 months.
107 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
1"'4
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2 years can pass before the court of appeals or supreme court
disposes of the case.I1s During all this time the cease and desist
order goes unenforced. Furthermore, these court proceedings
typically occur after the polluter has operated under a lengthy
variance from the Board.
4. Local Government Air Pollution Control Agencies
The lack of effective cooperation between state and local
pollution control agencies is another impediment to state-wide
pollution abatement. City agencies which are charged with
granting local variances to local polluters rarely attempt to
coordinate their decisions with the rulings of the State Air
Pollution Variance Board. Therefore, a polluter may operate
under two variances-one from the city and one from the
state. If the conditions of the two variances are not identical,
the polluter may find himself in an impossible dilemma. To
compound the problem, a 1972 "confidential" state report on
local air pollution agency efforts has charged that aggressive
air pollution enforcement actions are not being pursued by
city and county agencies.""5 Such statements, although they
may be true, help to aggravate the strain in relations between
state and local enforcement officials and diminish needed cooperation between city, county, and state pollution control
efforts.1 10
5.

The Attorney General's Office

The Attorney General's Office is given two basic functions with respect to air pollution enforcement, neither of which
is enumerated by the 1970 Act. First, an assistant attorney
general serves as the Board's sole source of legal expertise.
The duties of this legal advisor include examining witnesses,
making objections to questions posed by the polluter's attorney, and advising the Board on the legal justification for
its decisions. He is also given total responsibility for drafting
written opinions. The Board merely grants or denies a variance,
lists any conditions it may want to impose on the polluter, and
1,8Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist.
Ct. 1971), appeal filed sub nom. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado
Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971), argued
June 20, 1972.
"'' Denver Post, Jan, 30, 1972, at 23, col. 1. Accordirng to this 1972 report,
authored by the chief of the State Air Pollution Control Division, local
agencies are not succeeding because of insufficient personnel, lack of

technical capability, public apathy, lack of concern by public officials,

no strong political program support, and that old bugaboo, insufficient
funding.
110 The director of the Denver Air Pollution Control Section has publicly
stated that the State Air Pollution Control Commission is "guilty of
providing a great deal of totally false and completely undocumented
information." Denver Post, Dec. 1, 1971, at 3, col. 5.
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then leaves the formal and legally binding document to its
legal advisor.
These opinions are not overly instructive as to the process
through which the decision was reached. The legal advisor is
often unable to specify what facts were crucial to the Board's
determination or how the facts related to specific sections
of the Act. This is because the Board often fails to articulate
its reasons for a decision, and because the Board's attorney
is rarely present at the Board hearings. Polluters receive little
guidance as to what act or omission was responsible for their
success or failure before the Board. More importantly, from a
legal standpoint, reviewing courts may be unable to perform their statutory function. Both the United States111 and
Colorado' 12 Supreme Courts have observed that administrative
decisions require definite findings. Until the Board takes a
more active hand in its opinions, it runs the risk of incurring
unnecessary delay should a reviewing court decide to remand
for more specific findings.
The second function of the Attorney General's Office is
to act as counsel for the various agencies in any litigation which
may arise, including actions initiated to enforce orders and
regulations. The Attorney General's staff has performed this
task quite competently. They have successfully argued in
support of the constitutionality of the 1970 Act, 113 defended
the Board and Division against the claims of parties disputing
decisions," 4 and convinced courts to issue injunctions against
polluters who ignore valid cease and desist orders. 115
Practical Problems
Many practical aspects of the' air pollution problem are
beyond the reach of any act or agency no matter how well
drafted or efficiently run. The most obvious stumbling block is
the critical lack of truly effective pollution abatement equipB.

"' Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
"12 Lawless v. Bach, 489 P. 2d 316 (Colo. 1971); Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo.
536, 713 P. 2d 980 (1957). The practical reasons for requiring administrative findings have to do with facilitating judicial review, assuring
more careful administrative consideration, and avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions. As the United States Supreme Court
has stated: "We require that . . . enough be put on record to enable
us to perform the limited task which is ours." Eastern-Central Ass'n
v. United States, 321 U.S. 194. 212 (1944).
'13 Fry Bros. Roofing Co. v. State, Civil No. 20551 (Adams County Dist. Ct.
1971), appeal filed sub non. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado Air
Pollution Variance Bd., No. 25359 (Colo. Nov. 18, 1971); argued June
20, 1972.
11 State v. United Redi-Mix and United Sand & Gravel Co., Civil No.
18482 (Mesa County Dist. Ct. 1969).
15 See State v. Commerce City Auto Salvage, Civil No. B-98806 (Denver
Dist. Ct. 1967).
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ment. Technology, like law, experienced a late entrance into
the field of air pollution control. Few control devices are
presently in production and most of those available have not
been used for a sufficient length of time to judge long range
dependability." 6
More importantly, the cost of this equipment is so high
that only a well-funded polluter will have any hope of finding
the necessary capital, unless the public undertakes to spread
the cost. 117 Even assuming that the appropriate equipment is
available and that the particular polluter can afford it, there
remains a concatenation of commercial horrors which may
delay its installation almost indefinitely-strikes, shipping delays, backlogs, inventory shortages, work slowdowns, and all
the other common hazards of business life. 118 These unconIn fact, for some industries and pollution sources there are at the
present no air pollution control devices which could be installed to
terminate air pollution emissions, simply because engineering and technology have not advanced to the point where air pollution can be
eliminated. This means, of course, that even if a well-intentioned and
financially equipped polluter wished to end his air pollution violation,
he may, through the failings of technology, be unable to accomplish
this goal. Remarks by William D. Ruckelshaus, United States Environmental Protection Agency Administration at Denver "town meeting,"
Jan. 21, 1972.
Even when the devices such as electrostatic precipitators and
scrubbers are available, polluters have tremendous difficulty in obtaining reliable apparatus. The polluter usually must spend many years
learning how to use the apparatus efficiently, during which time it is
inevitably under pressure from environmental protection groups and
state agencies attempting to enforce the state's air pollution control
act. The Public Service Company, for example, estimates that "startup" time is 3 years after installation. Denver Post, Jan. 21, 1972, at
24, col. 5.
117 It has been estimated that strict application of clean air standards could
cost some $3.9 billion a year on a national basis. Denver Post, Jan. 3,
1972, at 24. col. 1. In Colorado, industry, excluding power companies,
spent some $3.3 million on pollution abatement in 1971; Robert
Connery of the Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry at
hearings before the Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission, Jan.
12, 1972. Large polluters, such as the Public Service Company and
C.F.&I. Steel Corp. of Pueblo, Colo. plan to spend over $15 million
over the next 3 years specifically for ordering, construction, and installation of pollution control equipment. Denver Post, Dec. 9, 1971, at
45, col. 2: Id., Dec. 16, 1971, at 47, col. 1. Although the expense seems
enormcus, this outlay is required by the size of the problem and the
scarcity of good pollution abatement equipment. The large expense
of controlling air pollution is very revealing-for it indicates that only
the very largest and richest polluters can afford the equipment which
is necessary to eliminate the important causes of air pollution.
118 The practicalities of business economics also involve themselves in the
air pollution problem and its eradication. One usually effective method
of disposing of a company's waste product besides burning it is to
convert it into another product or to sell it for some other use. Unfortunately, the smaller firms are not able to find markets for their
waste products as readily as the larger ones. Kaibab Industries case
before Variance Board, Jan. 6, 1972. Another economic problem posed
by the smaller polluters is that if they spend the requisit6 funds
for control equipment, they may have to lay off workers in order
to lower their operating costs. This forces the environmental control
agencies to choose between two important social goals- employment
and clean air.
116

1972

FAILURE OF STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

557

trollable problems make the need for tough legislation and
aggressive administration of pollution control laws even more
urgent.
The failure of adequate publicity is a final contributing
factor which assists the mismanagement of the state's overall air pollution control program. Publicity is needed to illuminate the policies and procedures of air pollution control and
arouse the public interest in the problem of air pollution. Due
to the absence of publicity concerning the internal workings of
the legal institutions responsible for implementing the state's
air pollution plan, the public has remained ignorant of the
policies and philosophies of these agencies and hence has remained unaware of what is wrong with the state's air pollution
laws. The lack of publicity is also responsible for the fact that
very few members of the public become directly involved in
the processes by which decisions or policy determinations are
made. Not only does this exclude many affected segments of
society from the environmental quality decision process, but
it also deprives those individuals who must make these decisions of pertinent evidence or testimony about the potential
or actual adverse effects caused by the polluter.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Colorado's experience with air pollution control offers
several valuable lessons for the future. First, no program can
succeed unless it is based upon a well-conceived, well-drafted
statute. The Colorado Act, like any other, is the child of
political compromise. Its weaknesses may stem from lobbiedfor ambiguities and omissions rather than poor draftsmanship.
Be that as it may, unless corrective legislation is enacted the
progress of abatement will continue to be halting.
Second, the administrative bodies charged with enforcing
the statute, no matter what its inherent weaknesses, must take
an aggressive stance in relation to their duties. The Colorado
Variance Board's performance could be vastly improved if it
were less intimidated by polluters. The procedural safeguards
which must be a part of any statute should not be allowed to
degenerate into a labyrinthine haven for procrastinating
polluters.
Finally, no abatement effort can succeed without strong
public support. Ideally, government is the vehicle through ,which
the will of the people is implemented. Government intransigence is a fact of political life which must be overcome if that
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will is to become reality. The ultimate responsibility for poor
legislation and poor enforcement must therefore fall on the
citizens of Colorado. Until the people make an unmistakeable,
continuing commitment to clean air, government will not be
forced to respond with continuing efforts to improve systems
and methods of control. As the Colorado experience amply
demonstrates, when a problem such as air pollution adversely
affects an entire community, when that problem is intimately
tied to that community's economic, social, and political roots,
and when the nature of the problem demands a technological
breakthrough which has not yet occurred, law and its legal institutions alone cannot directly or immediately bring about an
elimination or abatement of that problem.

